Salt Lake City v. Thomas James Taylor : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
Salt Lake City v. Thomas James Taylor : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Simarjit S. Gill, Jeanne M. Robison; Salt Lake City Prosecutor; attorneys for appellee.
F. Kevin Bond, Budge W. Call; Bond & Call L.C.; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake v. Taylor, No. 20020481 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3837
F. Kevin Bond (5039) 
Budge W. Call (5047) 
BOND&CALT.. T r 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant, 
311 South State, ;>uiu: 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8900 
Facsimile: (801) 521 -9?00 
SALT LAKE CITY. 
Plaintiff and Apj «u 
r> —FTi.. Ai l'l , i 
VS. 
THOMAS JAMES TAYLOR, 
Appellate Case No. 20020481 
Trial Court No. 011902296 
Defendant and Appella:- ~RAT ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Priori!;-, of Argument 29(b)(2) 
Defendant is rtr.t incarcerated 
THIS lb AA A P P I A L FROM THE CONVICTION AND SENTENCE 
ENTERED IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, V : i \K1 COUNTY 
Srmarjit b. urn 
Jeanne M. Robison 
Salt Lake City Prosecmo. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Appellee 
349 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 841II 
F. Kevin Bond 
Budge W. Call 
BOND & CALL..A 
Aiii >rnc> s for Defendant & Appellant 
South State Street, #450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
i f (| 
Ul. appeals 
URAL ARGUMEN I IS VI <QUESTI1) NOV 1 2 2302 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
F. Kevin Bond (5039) 
Budge W. Call (5047) 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant, 
311 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8900 
Facsimile: (801) 521-9700 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ) 
vs. ] 
THOMAS JAMES TAYLOR, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No. 20020481 
) Trial Court No. 011902296 
) ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Priority of Argument 29(b)(2) 
1 Defendant is not incarcerated 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM THE CONVICTION AND SENTENCE 
ENTERED IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Simarjit S. Gill F. Kevin Bond 
Jeanne M. Robison Budge W. Call 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor BOND & CALL L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff & Appellee Attorneys for Defendant & Appellant 
349 South 200 East 311 South State Street, #450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 4 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 4 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
Nature of case and course of proceeding 5 
Statement of Facts 8 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 15 
ARGUMENT 16 
I. THE EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
BATTERY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 16 
II. THE CITY'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE 
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF BRAITHWAITE 




TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Utah cases: Page 
State: 
Spanish Fork Citv v. Bryan. 975 P.2d 501 (Ut.App. 1999) 5,16,18 
State v. George. 481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971) 19 
State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) 5, 19, 20 
State v. Layman. 953 P.2d 782, 786 (Ut.App. 1998) 5 
State v. Martin. 984 P.2d 975 (Utah 1999) 20, 21 
State v. Murphy. 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980) 5, 16, 18, 20, 21 
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993) 5,16 
State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988) 20 
Federal: 
Parsons v. Galetka. 57 F.Supp 1151 (D.Utah 1999) 20 
Utah Statutes and Restatements: 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 4 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 19 
Section 76-5-1022(3)(a), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended); 
ASSAULT W/SUBSTANTIAL BODILY INJURY 5 
Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.020; BATTERY 6 
3 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter, pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
a. Did the trial court err in determining that there 
was sufficient evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, to show 
that the Defendant wilfully used unlawful force or violence 
upon the person of another without basis or self-defense? 
b. Is the ruling by the trial court against the clear 
weight of the evidence, given the testimony of all the witnesses? 
c. Did the trial court err in speculating that a touching 
occurred sufficient to constitute a battery? 
d. Is the guilty verdict valid when it is not based on 
any specific testimony relied upon by the court, but by the court's 
own inferences and speculation? 
e. Did the City fulfill its duty to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt the necessary elements for a battery? 
f . Did the prosecutor fail in her duty by not providing 
defense counsel with a known written statement of a witness, 
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which the court relied upon, and later found to be biased against 
the Defendant? 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
In reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, the trial court's judgment 
is sustained unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Spanish Fork 
Citv v. Brvan. 975 P.2d 501 (Ut.App. 1999); State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 786 (Ut.App. 
1998). However, before a conviction is upheld, "it must be supported by a quantum of 
evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged, from which the [factfinder] may 
base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 
(Utah 1980). In addition, "[a] guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on 
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." State v. Workman, 
852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). 
Whether a prosecutor adequately discloses information under Rule 16 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure is a legal question subject to review for correctness. State v. 
Knight. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of case and course of proceedings. The Appellant Taylor was 
originally charged with ASSAULT W/SUBSTANTIAL BODILY INJURY, § 76-5-102(3)(a), 
a Class A Misdemeanor in Salt Lake City on or about December 20, 2000, in a confrontation 
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with the alleged victim, Michael D. Breck. The charges were later amended to a BATTERY 
in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.020, a Class B Misdemeanor. The Amended 
Information was filed on May 9, 2002, accusing Taylor of willfully using unlawful force or 
violence upon the person of another. 
Taylor made a Motion for Discovery, under the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
on July 12, 2001. This included a request for the identity of all witnesses to be called at trial 
and written statements obtained from the Defendant or any witnesses. 
The case proceeded with a bench trial on May 10, 2002, before Judge Dennis 
M. Fuchs of the Third District Court. The following people were called as witnesses: 
Michael D. Breck; Joshua R. Braithwaite; Officer Aram Arslanian; Gary Holstein; Patrick 
Nelligan and Thomas Taylor. 
Mr. Breck, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Braithwaite, and Mr. Holstein, all testified that 
only one incident occurred. Mr. Breck, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Holstein, and Mr. Nelligan, all 
testified that the incident occurred by a delivery ramp between two parked vehicles, on the 
west side of the Brick's Club. One vehicle was described as a large boxy linen delivery van 
and the other, was the Defendant's vehicle. Mr. Holstein and Mr. Taylor both testified that 
the parties were arguing and then Mr. Breck lunged at Mr. Taylor; and Mr. Taylor then, put 
his hands up in defense, and that after the incident, Mr. Taylor immediately walked away and 
went into the building. 
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Mr. Braithwaite testified that he was driving south on 600 West at 15-20 mph 
when he happened to "glance" over and saw the incident occur at the corner of the block, not 
in front of the ramp on the west side of Brick's, and not between the two vehicles. He did 
not see the two vehicles, between which the incident occurred, according to all other 
witnesses, and claims he was able to watch the matter for 15-30 seconds, while driving 20 
mph. He testified that there were a number of times, six to eight, where Mr. Taylor shoved 
Mr. Breck with his hands to his chest, sending Mr. Breck back several feet each time. 
At the conclusion of trial, Judge Fuchs did not rely on the testimony of the 
Defendant, or the alleged victim, or the testimony of Mr. Holstein or Mr. Nelligan; but relied 
solely on the testimony of Mr. Braithwaite. Judge Fuchs did not actually believe Mr. 
Braithwaite's account of the incident as he testified, i.e., that the alleged victim was shoved in 
the chest 6 or 8 times, taking several steps back each time, and did not make such a finding; 
but Judge Fuchs went on to speculate that a physical confrontation must have occurred. The 
court found that Mr. Braithwaite was the only one that had an opportunity to observe the 
incident, when he was driving down the road at 15-20 mph. 
It was also discovered for the first time at trial, that Mr. Braithwaite, provided 
a written statement to the prosecutor. This was only discovered through cross-examination by 
defense counsel. This written statement contradicted Mr. Braithwaite's testimony at trial. 
After receiving the written statement, it was ultimately discovered that Mr. Braithwaite had 
7 
actually been kicked out of the Brick's Club, by Mr. Taylor for violating club rules, and 
therefore, he was not an unbiased or independent witness. 
After trial, the court found Taylor guilty and Taylor was sentenced, the same 
day, May 10, 2002, to 90 days jail, all suspended and a $250.00 fine, payable within 30 days. 
The court agreed to stay the matter if appealed. A Notice of Appeal was filed on June 7,2002. 
B. Statement of Facts, 
1. This matter arose, as a result of an incident on December 20, 2000, 
between the Defendant, Tom Taylor and the alleged victim, Michael Breck, west of the 
Defendant's property located on the corner of 600 West and 200 South, at a business called 
"Bricks", owned by the Defendant. (Rec. 62, Trial Tr. p. 6). 
2. Taylor was first charged with ASSAULT W/SUBSTANTIAL BODILY 
INJURY, § 76-5-1022(3)(a), a Class A Misdemeanor, on February 12, 2001. (Rec. 1) . 
3. There wasn't any substantial bodily injury, and therefore, a day before 
trial, on May 9,2002, the charge was amended to a BATTERY in violation of Salt Lake City 
Code § 11.08.020, a Class B Misdemeanor. The Amended Information, accuses Taylor of 
willfully using unlawful force or violence upon the person of another. (Rec. 49). 
4. On July 13, 2001, Taylor filed a written Motion for Discovery, 
requesting among other things, written statements of any witnesses, and the identity of all 
witnesses to be called at trial. (Rec. 6-8). 
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5. The case proceeded to trial on May 10, 2002. The alleged victim, 
Michael Breck, was the first to testify. He testified that he was on the Defendant's property 
trying to locate utility lines for Questar Gas. (Rec. 62, p. 6). 
6. Mr. Breck testified that he had put down the wrong marks initially and 
was trying to destroy these marks. (Rec. 62, p. 12). That Mr. Taylor approached him and 
told him he was trespassing. (Rec. 62, p. 12). Mr. Breck further testified that he was asked 
to leave the premises, but he refused. (Rec. 62, p. 20). Mr. Breck maintained that he 
answered all of Mr. Taylor's questions politely and never raised his voice. (Rec. 62, pp. 12 
&18). 
7. Mr. Breck then testified that as he was stepping off some paint marks, 
he was grabbed by the left shoulder and twisted, and grabbed by the right shoulder and 
shaken out into the road. (Rec. 62, p. 13). On cross-examination, Mr. Breck testified that 
there was just one incident on a gravely surface. (Rec. 62, p. 21). He also testified that he 
never lost his balance on the gravely surface or fell to the ground. (Rec. 62, p. 21). Mr. 
Breck received no visible injury from the alleged incident. (Rec. 62, p. 18). 
8. Mr. Breck further testified that he asked an alleged witness, Joshua 
Braithwaite to write a statement of the incident. (Rec. 62, p. 16). Mr. Braithwaite did write 
a statement and he gave it to the prosecutor. (Rec. 62, p.21). Defense counsel only learned 
of this written statement at trial during cross-examination, although, Mr. Braithwaite claims 
he gave a copy of it to the prosecutor. 
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9. Although Mr. Braithwaite claims he gave the statement to the 
prosecutor, the prosecutor claimed that she never received the original, but that she had been 
given a copy of the statement. (Rec. 62, p. 22). A copy of the statement was finally 
produced during trial, after its existence was discovered by defense counsel during cross-
examination. The prosecutor had the statement in her file at court. (Rec. 62, p. 22). It was 
later discovered that Mr. Braithwaite knew Mr. Taylor; knew he was the owner of the 
business, as he referred to him as the "owner" in his written statement, because Mr. 
Braithwaite had been kicked out of the club previously by Mr. Taylor for violating club 
rules. Mr. Braithwaite was not an independent witness, but had an axe to grind against the 
Defendant. This would have been discovered before trial, if disclosure would have been 
timely made. 
10. Mr. Braithwaite testified next. He testified that he was in the area 
reading water meters for Salt Lake City. (Rec. 62, p. 25) He was driving 15- 20 mph on 
600 West, and did not notice any vehicles parked on 600 West. (Rec. 62, p. 29) That while 
he was driving he "glanced" over to his left, and saw the Defendant, Taylor, shove Mr. Breck 
in the chest area. (Rec. 62, p. 27, line 11). Mr. Braithwaite did not see the victim grabbed 
by the left shoulder, the right shoulder, or any other place, as testified to by the alleged 
victim, but only that the alleged victim was shoved to the chest. (Rec. 62, p. 34). 
11. Mr. Braithwaite further testified that it was not just one time but several 
times, anywhere from 6 to 8 times, (Rec. 62, p. 35); and that with each shove Mr. Breck was 
taking 2-3 steps backwards. (Rec. 62, p. 36). Mr. Braithwaite testified that the incident 
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took place on the far northwest corner of the Bricks building, and that no vehicles were 
present on the side of the building at the time. (Rec. 62., p. 26). This statement is contrary 
to the testimony of all the other witnesses, including the alleged victim, Mr. Taylor, Mr. 
Holstein, and Mr. Nelligan, who all testified that the incident took place west of the ramp, 
not on the northwest corner; and that there were two vehicles parked on the west side of the 
building, and that the incident took place between these two vehicles. 
12. Mr. Braithwaite further testified that he only spoke with Mr. Breck on 
the date of the incident. (Rec. 62, p. 33). Mr. Braithwaite's written statement which was 
never provided by the prosecutor, indicated that Mr. Braithwaite talked to both Mr. Taylor 
and to Mr. Breck that day. The statement contradicts Mr. Braithwaite's testimony at the 
trial. Mr. Braithwaite testified that the 6-8 violent shoves from Mr. Taylor to Mr. Breck, 
were from Mr. Taylor's hands to Mr. Breck's chest. (Rec. 62, pp. 34 & 35). 
13. Salt Lake City Police Officer, Aaron Arslanian, then testified. He first 
talked to Mr. Breck, the alleged victim. (Rec. 62, p. 40). Then he talked to Mr. Taylor. 
(Rec. 62, p. 41) The officer saw Mr. Taylor's black jeep parked on 6th West where the 
incident occurred. (Rec. 62, p. 42). Mr. Taylor explained that Mr. Breck kept coming 
towards him and that he had to put up his hands to defend himself. (Rec. 62, p. 42). 
14. The officer also testified that Mr. Breck told him that he had refused to 
answer Mr. Taylor's questions. The officer testified that Mr. Breck said, "I refused to 
answer Mr. Taylor, wouldn't talk to him," and that this was consistent to what Mr. Taylor 
had told him, that Mr. Breck would not talk to him. (Rec. 62, p. 44). 
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15. At this point the City rested. The Defendant called Mr. Gary Holstein. 
Mr. Holstein testified that on the 20th day of December, 2000, he was sitting in the upstairs 
office at the Bricks business. (Rec. 62, p. 46). That the office has eight or nine security 
cameras that cover many areas inside and outside the building, including the west side ramp 
area, where the incident occurred. (Rec. 62, pp. 46 & 47). Mr. Holstein testified that there 
is a ramp on this side where deliveries are made; and in fact, at the time of the incident, a 
delivery was being made by American Linen, and that there was an American Linen truck, 
a large boxy truck, similar to a UPS truck, parked on the street. (Rec. 62, p. 48). 
16. Mr. Holstein testified that he saw Mr. Taylor and Mr. Breck from the 
west side security camera. He testified that he saw the whole incident, until Mr. Taylor 
walked away to come into the building. Mr. Holstein testified that Mr. Breck came towards 
Mr. Taylor in a very aggressive manner and that Mr. Taylor raised his hands in defense. 
(Rec. 62, p. 49). Mr. Holstein testified that Mr. Taylor did not strike, or take any offensive 
action, against Mr. Breck. (Rec. 62, p. 49) Mr. Holstein further testified that after this 
confrontation, Mr. Taylor immediately returned inside the office and was surprised at how 
aggressive Mr. Breck had been and wanted to call Mr. Breck's supervisor. (Rec. 62, p. 50). 
Mr. Holstein further testified that Mr. Breck turned and walked out of the view of the 
security camera. Then Mr. Holstein testified that he walked a few steps to the window 
overlooking the area; and Mr. Taylor then arrived at the office. (Rec. 62, p. 50). 
17. Mr. Patrick Nelligan, a delivery driver for American Linen company 
testified next. He testified that on December 20, 2000, he was making a delivery to the 
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Bricks business, and pulled up to the west entrance in his box van with a delivery of fresh 
linen. (Rec. 62, p. 72). Mr. Nelligan noticed Mr. Taylor arguing with another man between 
his boxy delivery van and the vehicle parked next to the delivery van, west of the delivery 
ramp. (Rec. 62, p. 75) Mr. Nelligan testified that he heard Mr. Taylor ask Mr. Breck to 
leave. (Rec. 62, p. 75). Mr. Nelligan further testified that both men were arguing loud 
enough to be heard; and that he did not witness any physical contact between them. (Rec. 
62, p. 75). 
18. Finally Mr. Taylor took the stand and testified that on December 20, 
2000, he was at the Bricks business. He drove up to the west side, parked his car to the right 
(south) of the delivery van, noticed that an individual was marking utility lines. (Rec. 62, 
p. 85). Mr. Taylor asked who he worked for and was told "Sprint," (Rec. 62, p. 86). 
19. Mr. Taylor attempted to talk to the individual, Mr. Breck, but Mr. Breck 
ignored him. (Rec. 62, p. 85). Mr. Breck then started wiping out the previous markings on 
the property and Mr. Taylor asked "What are you doing?" (Rec. 62, p. 86). The marks being 
removed were different than the ones Mr. Breck was putting down, so Mr. Taylor assumed 
the marks being removed were not his. (Rec. 62, p. 86). Mr. Taylor then said, "Hey, stop 
it. You need to leave," Mr. Breck then used obscene language and turned violently towards 
Mr. Taylor and lunged towards him. (Rec. 62, pp. 88 & 89). 
20. Mr. Taylor testified that he raised his hands so as to protect himself, at 
which time Mr. Breck made contact with Mr. Taylor's hands. (Rec. 62, pp. 88 & 89). Mr. 
Taylor testified that no further physical contact took place between the parties. (Rec. 62., 
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p. 89). He did not grab Mr. Breck on the right shoulder, the left shoulder, or anyplace else, 
and did not shove him. (Rec. 62, pp. 89 & 90). 
21. At the conclusion of trial, Judge Fuchs found that both Mr. Breck and 
Mr. Taylor were biased and had very selective memories. (Rec. 62, p. 108). 
22. The court found that Mr. Holstein was honest and reliable, and that Mr. 
Holstein testified to what he observed, but that there was an awful lot of time that he wasn't 
able to observe. (Rec. 62, p. 109) The court then speculated, "I don't know whether it 
happened later or before the time Mr. Holstein actually got up and walked over to the 
window." The court went on to find the City's theory on this to be only "supposition". (Rec. 
62, p. 109). 
23. The court found that Mr. Braithwaite's testimony was not consistent 
with Mr. Breck or Mr. Taylor, but that Mr. Braithwaite, "is the one independent witness who 
really does have an opportunity to observe what occurred, and the court does believe him 
when he stated that he observed some kind of an incident occurring between Mr. Breck and 
Mr. Taylor." (Rec. 62, p. 110) 
24. The court relied on one person's testimony, Mr. Braithwaite. (Rec. 62, 
p. 110). The court then found that some sort of a physical confrontation must have occurred, 
based on the testimony of Mr. Braithwaite, although the court found that it did not occur as 
Mr. Braithwaite described it. (Rec. 62. p. 110). 
25. The court also found that Mr. Nelligan was not prejudiced for or against 
Mr. Taylor, but he couldn't see what happened. (Rec. 62, p. 109). Mr. Nelligan did observe 
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what was happening that day. He saw the cars parked as the other witnesses described them; 
and saw 2 people arguing. (Rec. 62, p. 74). He heard raised voices, heard Mr. Taylor ask 
Mr. Breck to leave the premises, and heard Mr. Breck use vulgar language towards Mr. 
Taylor. (Rec. 62, p. 75). Nevertheless, the court discounted his testimony completely. 
26. After trial, the time for sentencing was waived, and Taylor was sentenced 
the same day, to 90 days jail, with the jail time suspended upon the payment of fines and fees 
in the amount of $250.00. (Rec. 62, p. 114). The fine was order to be paid within 30 days, 
to be stayed if appealed. (Rec. 62, p. 115). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court found that a battery occurred in this case, not based on the 
testimony presented at trial, but based on possibilities and probabilities. The court relies on 
one witness, Mr. Braithwaite, whose testimony is inconsistent with the other witnesses, the 
Defendant, and even the alleged victim. Further, the court does not accept the testimony of Mr. 
Braithwaite, but merely refers to his testimony in speculating that "some kind of an incident 
occurred" between Mr. Breck and Mr. Taylor. Such conjecture by the trial court, cannot 
support a criminal conviction and cannot be a substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Spanish Fork Citv v. Brvam 975 P.2d 501, 504. (Ut.App. 1999). 
The prosecution failed to disclose a written statement from an alleged eye witness 
to the incident. The Defendant was entitled to such information; and such information 
sufficiently creates a likelihood of a different result, going to the credibility of the one witness, 
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that the court believed; that such failure was prejudicial to the Defendant, sufficient to warrant 
reversal of the conviction. State v. Martin, 984 P.2d 975 (Utah 1999). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
BATTERY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The City has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant committed each element of the crime charged. Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 
P.2d 501 (Ut.App. 1999). Before a conviction is upheld, "it must be supported by a quantum 
of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged, from which the [factfinder] may 
base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 
(Utah 1980). In addition, "[a] guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on 
inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." State v. Workman, 
852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, the trial court did not place any weight on the testimony of Mr. 
Taylor or the victim, Mr. Breck. The trial court relied on one person, Mr. Braithwaite. 
However, the trial court did not find the facts as Mr. Braithwaite described them, but rather 
proceeded on inference and speculation, that some contact had occurred. This speculation is 
not based on sufficient evidence for the fact finder to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Murphv. 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980). 
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Such speculation, given the testimony of the other witnesses, is against the clear 
weight of the evidence. Mr. Braithwaite did not have the best opportunity to view the incident. 
Mr. Braithwaite was driving in the area at 15-20 mph when he happened to "glance" over his 
left shoulder. He didn't notice the vehicles parked on 600 West that all the other witnesses 
described. He also never saw the alleged victim grabbed by the shoulders as described by the 
alleged victim. Rather, he testified that Mr. Breck was being shoved six to eight times, with 
shoves to the chest; and that it was not just a single time, but several times; and that with each 
shove Mr. Breck was taking 2-3 steps back. This is contrary to all the other testimony, 
including the victim, who claimed that he was grabbed and twisted by the Defendant once. 
The Court did not believe that the victim was shoved six times or eight times or 
that he was pushed back 24 or 30 feet, as testified to by Mr. Braithwaite, but then goes on to 
say that based on Mr. Braithwaite's testimony, there was some physical confrontation. (Rec. 
62, p. 110). This is mere inference and speculation, especially in light of the testimony of the 
Defendant, the alleged victim, himself (that he was not pushed) and Mr. Holstein who 
witnessed the specific incident. 
Furthermore, the testimony of Mr. Braithwaite not only contradicted the 
testimony of the Defendant and the alleged victim, but also was inconsistent with his own 
written statement that he gave on location, which was never disclosed to Defendant's counsel. 
For example, in his written statement Mr. Braithwaite states he was driving down the street 
and glanced over and saw the owner of the place grab this "employie" [sic] and shove him off 
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the property. He also reported that he stopped and talked to both of them and asked if 
everything was OK. At trial he testified he never saw the Defendant grab Mr. Breck, and that 
he only talked to Mr. Breck after die incident. He also testified that afterwards, Mr. Taylor 
immediately left and went inside the building. 
The trial court found Mr. Holstein to be honest, but found that there was an 
awful lot of time that Mr. Holstein wasn't able to observe. However, there is no evidence of 
this lack of observation. Mr. Holstein, testified that he watched the entire incident, until Mr. 
Taylor left to come into the building. Everyone, including the victim, Mr. Holstein, and Mr. 
Taylor all testified there was only one incident, and afterwards Mr. Taylor immediately went 
into the building. The court's questioning as to whether the alleged incident took place, after 
Mr. Holstein got up and walked to the window, is not in evidence, as Mr. Holstein testified 
he watched until Mr. Taylor walked away and Mr. Breck walked away out of the view of the 
security camera. Regardless, such a claim without any evidence would be as the court phrased 
it only "supposition." (Rec. 62, p. 109). 
Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture or supposition. They must be 
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither possibilities nor probabilities can 
substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable doubt. Spanish Fork City v. Bryan. 975 P.2d 501, 
504 (Ut.App. 1999), citing State v. Murphy. 617 P.2d at 402 ("Criminal convictions may not 
be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before we can uphold a conviction it must be 
supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from 
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which the jury may base its conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt"); See also State v. George, 
481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971). 
To find that speculative inferences can constitute proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is to attack one of the most sacred constitutional safeguards at its core. State v. 
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 1993). When an inference of guilt does not logically flow 
from the evidence, it is incumbent on the reviewing court to set the verdict aside. Id. at 987. 
II. THE CITY'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THE 
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF BRAITHWAITE 
WAS PREJUDICIAL AND HARMFUL ERROR. 
Rule 16 of the Utah R. of Crim. P. governs the disclosure of evidence in a 
criminal case. Rule 16(a)(4) requires the disclosure of evidence known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the 
degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and (5) requires the disclosure of any other item 
of evidence which the court determines on good cause should be made available to the 
defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. Rule 16(b) requires that 
the disclosure be made a soon as practicable following the filing of chairges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make such disclosures. 
In the case of State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that the prosecutor under Rule 16 must: (1) either produce all of the material 
requested or must identify explicitly those portions of the request for which no responsive 
material will be provided; and (2) must continue to disclose such material on an ongoing basis 
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to the defendant. Id. Due process requires the state to disclose even unrequested information, 
which may or may not be exculpatory. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988). CL 
Parsons v. Galetka, 57 F.Supp 1151 (D.Utah 1999) (under this rule, which imposes a broader 
disclosure obligation on the prosecutor than does the federal rule, the prosecutor is obligated 
to make disclosure on a continuing basis without a request). 
In State v. Knight, supra, the Court went on to say that such an error warrants 
reversal only if it is "harmful," i.e., "only if a review of the record persuades the court that 
without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
defendant." Id. The question is therefore, first, whether the defendant was entitled to the 
information and, second, if he was, whether that information would create a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result such that the confidence in the outcome is undermined. 
State v. Martin, 984 P.2d 975 (Utah 1999). 
To the first prong there is no question, but that the concealed evidence in this 
case, would have been admissible. It was a written statement made by an alleged witness to 
the incident. The evidence was in fact admitted by the trial court, after it was discovered to 
exist by the Defendant in the middle of the trial. Focusing on the second prong, the 
information may have affected the outcome of the case, if it would have been provided in a 
more timely manner. 
Failure to disclose in a timely manner is not harmless error in this case, as Mr. 
Braithwaite is the only witness that the trial court relied on in finding the Defendant guilty. 
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The statement had important information and facts that were inconsistent with Mr. 
Braithwaite's testimony at trial; and which ultimately resulted in the discovery or Mr. 
Braithwaite's bias and prejudice against Mr. Taylor. This may have affected the outcome, as 
the court relied on Mr. Braithwaite's testimony in large part, based on his assumed 
independence. This assumption could have been challenged at trial, had it been produced 
timely. Such strong impeachment evidence would go to the central issue of the case, and Mr. 
Braithwaite's credibility on the stand. This is not harmless error. State v. Martin, 984 P.2d 
975 (Utah 1999). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court relied on the testimony of one person, Mr. Braithwaite. 
However, the trial court did not find the facts as Mr. Braithwaite described them, but rather 
proceeded on inference and speculation, that "some kind of an incident" probably occurred. 
This speculation is not based on sufficient evidence for the fact finder to find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Possibilities and probabilities are no substitute for certainty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
The prosecutor failed to disclose a written statement made by Mr. Braithwaite, 
the sole witness the trial court relied upon, made soon after the incident. The statement 
contained facts and information that was inconsistent with Mr. Braithwaite's testimony at trial. 
Such evidence goes to the credibiUty of Mr. Braithwaite and his testimony at trial, a critical 
issue in the case. Therefore, such failure was sufficient to warrant reversal of the conviction. 
21 
The Appellant seeks a determination from this court that sufficient evidence was 
not presented to overcome the burden of certainty beyond a reasonable doubt; and that 
information was not properly disclosed, that resulted in prejudice to the Defendant; and that 
based on the foregoing, the conviction of the Defendant should be reversed. 
DATED this / ^ day of November, 2002. 
/ ^ ^ / ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
F. Kevin Bond 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Trial Exhibit Number 1. Written statement by Mr. Braithwaite. 
B. Transcript of the trial court's oral decision. (Rec. 62, pp. 108-112). 
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happens at that point — I think he's unlawfully there. 
I think he was there unlawfully. He was asked to 
leave. He doesn't do it. He turns to Mr. Taylor. Limited 
contact. Certainly who was the aggressor? I think it was 
Mr. Breck, and what was he doing even being there at that 
point? He should have left. 
Mr. Taylor goes in his own building. He leaves. He 
doesn't come out. Even when the police arrive he invites them 
in. He doesn't go back out. What does Mr. Breck do? He 
remains on the premises. He sits out there, and we sit and 
watch him on the monitors, and we call. 
I think he did anything that a reasonable person could 
be expected to do to try to avoid the conflict, considering what 
went on that day. Certainly was there a willful or unlawful use 
of force? I don't think so. I don't see that. 
THE COURT: Okay. Any rebuttal? 
MS. PARKINSON: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You know, I listened to all their testimony 
and I listened to all the argument and I have to be honest 
with you. The only two people that I think have any bias and 
selective memory in regards to this trial are Mr. Breck and 
Mr. Taylor. I think they both have very selective memories as 
to what occurred. 
I think all the other witnesses, even though the City 
tried to argue that they're not credible and that they have some 



























bias, I think were pretty honest and I don't think that their 
bias enters into it. 
I think that Mr. — let's start with the employee 
who is Mr. Holstein. I think that Mr. Holstein is honest 
and I don't necessarily think that Mr. Holstein would lie on 
Mr. Taylor's behalf. I think he testified to what he observed, 
but I think there was an awful lot of time that he wasn't able 
to observe. He said he was in his office working. He says his 
attention was drawn to the cameras when he heard an argument. 
What we don't know, as I understand it, one of the 
theories the State is going — the City is going under is the 
pushing and shoving happened later. I don't know whether it 
happened later or before, but there was a time period that 
Mr. Holstein was not observing what occurred on the monitors 
when he actually got up and walked over to the window. They 
tried to say that that's the exact amount of time that it 
took Mr. Taylor to come into the building, but that's only 
supposition. 
We have Mr. Hoi — not Mr. Holstein — Mr. Nelligan, 
who worked for the linen. I don't think there's any bias or 
prejudice for or against Mr. Taylor. I don't think his job 
depends on whether Mr. Taylor is happy with what he testifies to 
or not. He delivers for American Linen, but I think the crucial 
part of his testimony was he heard them arguing. He couldn't 



























inside, and in fact he purposely tried not to see, because he 
didn't want anything to do with it. 
So then that leaves me with one person's testimony, 
Mr. Braithwaite. Defense would like to attack Mr. Braithwaite 
because his testimony is not consistent with that of Mr. Taylor 
and Mr. Breck. No, very rarely is testimony consistent, but 
Mr. Braithwaite is the one independent witness who really does 
have an opportunity to observe what occurred, and this Court 
does believe him when he stated that he observed some kind of 
an incident occurring between Mr. Beck and Mr. Taylor. 
Whether that incident, as Mr. Beck describes it, for 
whatever reasons he chooses to remember what occurs, whether 
it was being grabbed by the shoulders and twisted, I don't 
know, but this Court does believe that there was touching 
that occurred, and that there was a shoving that occurred. 
Mr. Braithwaite — he may not have shoved him six times, and 
he may not have fallen back 24 or 30 feet, but I don't think 
that Mr. Braithwaite made up the fact that there was some 
physical confrontation between these two individuals. I do 
not believe that what he observed was the defensive move on 
behalf of Mr. Taylor's part. 
Now, in regards to self-defense, I did not really hear 
any testimony other than Mr. Taylor's story and Mr. Holstein 
that all of a sudden Mr. Beck came at him and Mr. Taylor just 



























I think more than that occurred, and I do not believe that in 
that particular regard that Mr. Beck was doing anything, whether 
rightly or wrongly, for whatever reasons he chose, but to go 
back and try and finish the job that he started. 
I believe that Mr. Taylor may be — may have been 
incredibly frustrated, that there may have been an argument 
between the two, that Mr. Beck may not have been cooperative, 
that he may not have been answering the questions, that he may 
have also used foul and abusive language, that he may have 
persisted in doing a job that maybe he shouldn't have persisted 
in doing, but this Court believes that Mr. Taylor lost his 
temper for whatever reason, and whether strongly — not 
strongly. Obviously Mr. Beck didn't lose his feet, but he 
attempted to push Mr. Beck away. 
Now, you bring up the self-defense. I do not feel 
that I've heard any testimony that rises to the level of self-
defense. You bring up the issue of being on his property. To 
be honest with you, I didn't necessarily hear any testimony 
that any of this occurred on Bricks property. In fact, it was 
Mr. Beck's testimony that it happened out in the road. Even 
the first mark that he was trying to erase was still out off 
of Bricks' property. 
Even if it occurred on Bricks' property I don't think 
that Mr. Taylor was legally allowed to use any kind of force to 



























company, and probably they do have an easement and a right-of-
way when he's doing his job. The proper thing obviously would 
have been to call Blue Stakes before this occurred, not after it 
occurred. 
This Court does not make a decision based on any 
consequences that might occur. I understand that there is 
another lawsuit. Again, I understand that both parties have 
selective memory in regards to this matter, but I can't concern 
myself with what that other lawsuit is, and I wouldn't one way 
or the other, but based on the evidence I've heard here today, 
based on the credibility of the witnesses, based strongly on 
Mr. Braithwaite's testimony, this Court is convinced that there 
was an assault that occurred, and therefore finds Mr. Taylor 
guilty of the charge. 
Counsel, in regards to sentencing, do you want 
sentencing to occur today? 
MR. BOND: I think we'd waive the time for that. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything from the City prior to 
sentencing? 
MS. PARKINSON: Your Honor, the City would submit, but 
the City would like your Honor to know that he does have a prior 
assault on a peace officer. It was in 1998, and our office has 
had numerous situations and dealings with — although its not 
necessarily related to violence, but with some dealings with 
Bricks. State would just submit. 
